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McCULLOCHAND THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT
Jennifer Mason McAward*
Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment gives Congress the "power
to enforce" the ban on slavery and involuntay servitude "by appropriate
legislation." The conventional view of Section 2 regards this language
as an allusion to McCulloch v. Maryland's explication of Congress's
executory powers, and holds that Congress has substantial,and largely
unreviewable, power to determine both the ends and the means of Section
2 legislation.
This Essay argues that the conventional view departsfrom the original meaning of Section 2. It demonstrates that McCulloch preserved a
roleforjudicialreview with respect to both the ends and means offederal
legislation. This role was clearly part of the understandingand anticipated application ofMcCulloch by the time the Thirteenth Amendment
was ratified and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 enacted. This Essay concludes that Section 2 preserves a role for meaningfuljudicialreview and
grants Congress power to regulate conduct that threatens the reinvigoration of slavery or involuntary servitude, but not near-plenarypower over
all civil or human rights.
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INTRODUCTION

Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment gives Congress the "power
to enforce" the ban on slavery and involuntary servitude "by appropriate
legislation."' Although this language was an innovation as a matter of
constitutional text, the concept of "appropriate legislation" was well
known as a matter of constitutional law. The text of Section 2, it is commonly assumed, alludes to the Supreme Court's explication of Congress's
executory powers in McCulloch v. Maryland: Thus, "all means which are
appropriate, which are plainly adapted to [a legitimate] end, which are
not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution,
2
are constitutional."
Since the 1880s, members of the Supreme Court have regarded
McCulloch as demonstrating "the spirit in which the [Thirteenth]
[A] mendment is to be interpreted, and develop [ing] fully the principles
to be applied" in evaluating Section 2 legislation.' In the Civil Rights
Cases, the Court held that Section 2 empowers Congress to outlaw slavery
and involuntary servitude, and also "to pass all laws necessary and proper
4
for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States."
In 1968, in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., the Court further stated that
Congress has the power "rationally to determine what are the badges and
the incidents of slavery," as well as "the authority to translate that determination into effective legislation." 5
The conventional view is that the Civil Rights Cases and Jones simply
applied McCulloch deference to the Thirteenth Amendment enforcement
power by giving Congress substantial, and largely unreviewable, power to
determine both the ends and the means of Section 2 legislation.6 Under
this view, Section 2 provides Congress an untapped but potentially expansive power to address everything from hate crimes,7 hate speech,8 ra-

1. U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § 2.
2. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
3. United States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785, 792 (Swayne, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Ky.
1866) (No. 16,151).
4. 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).
5. 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968).
6. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, The Reconstruction Power, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1801, 181621 (2010) ("McCulloch teaches us that all means reasonably adapted to achieve [equal citizenship] fall within Congress's power."). But see id. at 1819-21 (noting Justice Harlan's
dissent, and not majority opinion of Civil Rights Cases, supports this view).
7. See Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 249 (Supp. IV 2011) (defining prohibited hate crimes).
8. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Case of the Missing Amendment: LA. V v. City of St.
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cial profiling,9 and disproportionate capital sentencing of black defendants, 10 to violence against women," sexual14harassment,12 and restrictions
3
on reproductive rights and gay marriage.
I have argued elsewhere that, properly understood, the Section 2
power is far less sweeping than the conventional view suggests. 15 It permits regulation not of every civil rights issue but only of conduct that will
prevent or remedy violations of Section 1, including a discrete subset of
racially discriminatory behavior. 6 Previously, I have noted the link between McCulloch and Section 2 and assumed that the former was consistent with this more limited view of the Section 2 power. 7 This Essay
explores and ultimately confirms that assumption, thus challenging the
conventional view that McCulloch licenses expansive, and virtually unchecked, congressional power in the Thirteenth Amendment context.

Paul, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 124, 155-60 (1992) (arguing racial hate speech could be considered badge of slavery).
9. See William M. Carter, Jr., A Thirteenth Amendment Framework for Combating
Racial Profiling, 39 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 17, 19 (2004) (arguing Thirteenth Amendment
provides stronger constitutional basis than Fourteenth for combating racial profiling).
10. See Douglas L. Colbert, Liberating the Thirteenth Amendment, 30 Harv. C.R.C.L. L. Rev. 1, 47-49 (1995) (describing hypothetical Thirteenth Amendment analysis of
capital sentencing).
11. See Marcellene Elizabeth Hearn, Comment, A Thirteenth Amendment Defense
of the Violence Against Women Act, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1097, 1098 (1998) (arguing
Thirteenth Amendment is necessary alternative to Fourteenth Amendment or Commerce
Clause as basis for Violence Against Women Act).
12. See Jennifer L. Conn, Sexual Harassment: A Thirteenth Amendment Response,
28 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 519, 521 (1995) (contending Thirteenth Amendment gives
courts "the power to overcome the free speech obstacles to regulating sexually-harassing
behavior").
13. See Pamela D. Bridgewater, Reproductive Freedom as Civil Freedom: The
Thirteenth Amendment's Role in the Struggle for Reproductive Rights, 3 J. Gender Race
& Just. 401, 403 (2000) (suggesting Thirteenth Amendment can be used "to protect
against modern reproductive abuses.., via the history of slave breeding").
14. Cf. Sarah C. Courtman, Comment, Sweet Land of Liberty: The Case Against the
Federal Marriage Amendment, 24 Pace L. Rev. 301, 328 (2003) (arguing prohibitions on
same-sex marriage "put homosexuals.., in the same position as freed slaves after the civil
war: free in name only and shackled in the eyes of the state").
15. See Jennifer Mason McAward, The Scope of Congress's Thirteenth Amendment
Enforcement Power After City of Boerne v. Hores, 88 Wash. U. L. Rev. 77, 142-47 (2010)
[hereinafter McAward, Scope] (rejecting expansive view that Thirteenth Amendment
gives Congress power to define and address badges and incidents of slavery, subject only to
rational basis review); see also Jennifer Mason McAward, Congressional Authority to
Interpret the Thirteenth Amendment: A Response to Professor Tsesis, 71 Md. L. Rev. 60,
63-64 (2011) (criticizing expansive view from perspectives of history, separation of powers,
and federalism).
16. See Jennifer Mason McAward, Defining the Badges and Incidents of Slavery, 14
U. Pa.J. Const. L. 561, 606 (2012) [hereinafter McAward, Defining] (arguing concept of
badges and incidents of slavery refers to widespread discriminatory conduct that poses risk
of de facto return of slavery).
17. McAward, Scope, supra note 15, at 117.
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Indeed, this Essay argues that current Thirteenth Amendment doctrine departs from the original meaning of Section 2-including
McCulloch as it was understood when the Amendment was ratified-in
three ways. First, the doctrine confuses the ends and means of Thirteenth
Amendment legislation. Second, it improperly minimizes the role of the
judiciary in reviewing the ends of such legislation as well as the concept
of the badges and incidents of slavery. And third, it fails to preserve a sufficiently meaningful role for the Court to assess the fit between
Congress's choice of means and constitutional ends.
As Part I explains, the standard, post-New Deal account of McCulloch
posits that Congress has near-plenary power in passing executory legislation. However, while McCulloch established that Congress enjoys wide discretion in assessing the necessity of the means by which it pursues constitutional ends, the opinion also provided multiple areas for meaningful
judicial review. The ends must be "legitimate,"' 8 and the chosen means
must "tend[] directly to"19 a legitimate end. These elements of the decision, which constrained Congress and preserved a role for the Court,
shaped the understanding and application of McCulloch throughout the
mid-nineteenth century. Prigg v. Pennsylvania,20 a case cited by the drafters of the Thirteenth Amendment,21 bears this out. In Prigg, the Court
upheld the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 not out of institutional deference
but after performing an independent review of constitutional ends as
22
well as the means employed by the statute.
Part II considers the McCulloch origins of Section 2. The sponsors of
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (who also were the sponsors of the
Thirteenth Amendment) argued that Section 2 empowered Congress to
protect certain civil rights as a means to the end of securing the demise
of slavery. 23 They invoked McCulloch and Prigg to counter opponents'
arguments that Section 2 permitted only legislation directly pertaining to
coerced labor. 24 The Act's supporters did not, however, suggest that
Section 2 empowered Congress to define the ends of the Thirteenth
Amendment.2 5 Nor did they claim that any causal relationship between
means and ends, however attenuated, would suffice for Section 2 pur-

18. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
19. Id. at 419.
20. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
21. See infra note 158 (noting Representative James F. Wilson used Prigg to argue
Congress has power to protect natural rights of citizens).
22. See 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 539-42 (reviewing extent of power Constitution grants
Congress relating to fugitive slaves).
23. See infra notes 143-154 and accompanying text (recounting legislative history of
Civil Rights Act of 1866).
24. See infra notes 142, 151-154, 158 and accompanying text (describing invocations
of McCulloch and Prigg).
25. See infra notes 143-145 and accompanying text (noting Act's supporters agreed
with critics that Constitution defined ends of Thirteenth Amendment).
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poses. Rather, they emphasized-and any reasonable observer would
have recognized-the close causal link between the rights protected by
the Act and a state of meaningful freedom for the former slaves.2726 This
same view of Section 2 prevailed in the Supreme Court until Jones.
Part III considers how to restore the McCulloch vision of Section 2. It
accepts that Section 2 permits Congress to pass laws that target the
badges and incidents of slavery. 28 The McCulloch vision of Section 2, however, requires a more precise understanding of why and how Congress is
permitted to regulate this conduct. Congress is empowered to address
the badges and incidents of slavery not because they are themselves unconstitutional and therefore their eradication is an end in itself, but because doing so is a means to the end of preventing the reinvigoration of
slavery or involuntary servitude. In other words, the concept of the
badges and incidents of slavery forms the outer boundary of Congress's
prophylactic enforcement power under Section 2.29
Therefore, Part III addresses three related issues: the scope of the
right conveyed by Section 1, the scope of Congress's power to define the
badges and incidents of slavery, and the scope of Congress's power to
regulate the badges and incidents of slavery. The McCulloch vision of
Section 2 suggests that current doctrine inappropriately minimizes the
role of the judiciary with respect to all three issues. By treating the
badges and incidents of slavery as ends in and of themselves, and by allowing Congress to define that concept, Jones misallocated the Court's
own substantive definitional power. Furthermore, the understanding of
McCulloch that prevailed during the 1860s preserved some space for the
Court to ensure that Congress's chosen means are not "remote" from the
30
goal of preventing the return of slavery.
Ultimately, the true McCulloch reading of the Thirteenth
Amendment safeguards a role for meaningful judicial review of Section 2
legislation and provides discretion for Congress to regulate not only
conduct directly tied to slavery and involuntary servitude themselves, but
also a limited subset of discriminatory conduct that threatens the rein-

26. See infra notes 141-152 (recounting legislative history of Civil Rights Act of
1866).
27. See infra Part II.C (describing "consistent methodology" in Court's evaluation of
Section 2 legislation until "major shift" with Jones).
28. See, e.g., text accompanying note 215.
29. See McAward, Scope, supra note 15, at 142 ("[T]o constitute an adequate limitation on Congress's power, the 'badges and incidents of slavery' must be understood as a
term of art with a finite range of meaning that is tied closely to the core aspects of the slave
system and its aftermath.").
30. See John Marshall, Marshall's "A Friend to the Union" Essays [hereinafter
Marshall, Union], in John Marshall's Defense of McCulloch v. Maryland 91, 100 (Gerald
Gunther ed., 1969) ("[W]hen [the Court] uses 'conducive to,' that word is associated with
others plainly showing that no remote, no distant conduciveness to the object, is in the
mind of the court.").
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vigoration of slavery or involuntary servitude. Although this view runs
counter to conventional "Thirteenth Amendment optimism,"3 1 it does
not preclude Congress from protecting a broad array of civil rights.
Rather, it encourages Congress to focus on enforcing the unfulfilled
promises of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and harnessing
its broad Commerce Clause power. At the same time, this view acknowledges the fundamental success of the Thirteenth Amendment and avoids
the redundancy that would arise if Section 2 were viewed as a source of
near-plenary power over all civil or human rights.
I. THE MCCULLOCHPOWER
Since the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, the Supreme
Court has held that McCulloch v. Maryland32 provides the proper standard
for evaluating legislation passed pursuant to Congress's Section 2
power.33 The standard view of McCulloch, at least since the New Deal, emphasizes Congress's virtually unchecked discretion to choose the means
by which to pursue constitutional ends.34 In the Thirteenth Amendment
context, the Court has invoked McCulloch to hold that Section 2 empowers Congress both to define and eradicate the "badges and incidents of
slavery."35
In fact, McCulloch preserved a meaningful role for judicial review,
both with respect to Congress's choice of means and particularly with
respect to its pursuit of ends. Even more importantly, these elements of
the opinion were critical to the public understanding and judicial application of McCulloch in the years preceding the ratification of the
Thirteenth Amendment. Thus, invoking McCulloch in the Section 2 context does not inexorably lead to the conclusion that minimal judicial
31. See Jamal Greene, Thirteenth Amendment Optimism, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 1733,
1735 (2012) (defining Thirteenth Amendment optimists as those who "argu[e] that the
Amendment prohibits... practices that one opposes but that do not in any obvious way
constitute either chattel slavery or involuntary servitude").
32. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
33. See, e.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 443-44 (1968) (holding Civil
Rights Act of 1866 was "appropriate" legislation as described in McCulloch).
34. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Regrettable Clause: United States v. Comstock and the
Powers of Congress, 48 San Diego L. Rev. 713, 759 (2011) (arguing Court adopted nationalist position-that legislation is constitutional so long as it falls within scope of Congress's
powers-during New Deal era); see also Keith E. Whittington, Judicial Review of Congress
Before the Civil War, 97 Geo. L.J. 1257, 1257 (2009) [hereinafter Whittington, Judicial
Review] (noting that before Civil War "U]udicial review of Congress was exceptional and
idiosyncratic"). But see United States v. Comstock, 130 S.Ct. 1949, 1965 (2010) (articulating "five considerations" relevant to determining whether statute is "necessary and proper"
means of exercising federal authority).
35. See Jones, 392 U.S. at 440 ("Surely Congress has the power under the Thirteenth
Amendment rationally to determine what are the badges and incidents of slavery, and the
authority to translate the determination into effective legislation."); The Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).
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oversight of legislation regarding the badges and incidents of slavery is
appropriate. Rather, a proper understanding of McCulloch and the original public meaning of Section 2 might well require a refinement of current Section 2 doctrine.
A. McCulloch
McCulloch addressed the question of Congress's power to charter the
Bank of the United States. Article I of the Constitution did not expressly
empower Congress to charter a bank, and some, including James
Madison and Thomas Jefferson, argued that the Necessary and Proper
Clause permits "only the means which are 'necessary,' not those which
are merely 'convenient,' for effecting the enumerated powers."36 Chartering a bank was unconstitutional because, at best, it "might be conceived
to be conducive to the successful conducting of the finances; or might be
conceived to tend to give facility to the obtaining of loans."37 Supporters
of the Bank, including Alexander Hamilton, criticized this reading of the
Clause as unfairly limiting Congress." Rather, the sovereign has the right
to employ means that are "needful, requisite, incidental, useful, or conducive to" "the attainment of the ends of" "every power vested in a
39
Government."
McCulloch ultimately became a test case on the bank's constitutionality. 40 In his famous opinion, Chief Justice Marshall sided with the
Hamiltonian understanding of congressional power. First, Marshall
stated that Congress had implied power to "select any appropriate
means" by which to effectuate Congress's enumerated powers "to lay and
collect taxes; to borrow money; to regulate commerce; to declare and
conduct a war; and to raise and support armies and navies."41 He rejected
the argument that the Necessary and Proper Clause limited the scope of
that implied power, declining to read the term "necessary" as restricting
Congress's discretion to means that are "indispensable."4 2 Instead, he
held that the Clause empowered Congress to employ "any means calcu-

36. E.g., Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bill to Establish a
National Bank (Feb. 15, 1791), in Contexts of the Constitution 540, 542 (Neil H. Cogan
ed., 1999).
37. James Madison, Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bill to Establish a
National Bank (Feb. 2, 1791), in Contexts of the Constitution, supra note 36, at 527, 531.
38. E.g., Alexander Hamilton, Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bill to
Establish a National Bank (Feb. 23, 1791), in Contexts of the Constitution, supra note 36,
at 544, 548.
39. Id. at 545, 548.
40. See Daniel A. Farber, The Story of McCulloch: Banking on National Power, in
Constitutional Law Stories 33, 44 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2d ed. 2009) ("By agreement between the state attorney general and federal officials, [McCulloch] became a test case on
the constitutionality of the bank.").
41. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407, 410 (1819).
42. Id. at 413.
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lated to produce the end, and not Uust those] without which the end
would be entirely unattainable."4" The assessment of the "degree of
necessity" between the chosen means and the constitutional end is a task
for the legislature. "This court disclaims all pretentions to such a
power."" Accordingly, "[l]et the end be legitimate, let it be within the
scope of the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which
are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist
with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional."45
Since the New Deal, the standard reading of McCulloch emphasizes
Congress's wide latitude in choosing the means by which to effectuate its
enumerated powers and posits that the Court must accord near-complete
deference to those choices. As Evan Caminker has described, a law is
valid as long as "it is sufficiently tailored to carry into execution" a legitimate governmental end or power.46 While Congress's choice of legislative
means must be "plainly adapted" or "conducive to" a legitimate end,
these standards "lack independent bite," and are assessments for
47
Congress solely to make.
There are elements of the McCulloch opinion, however, that point to
judicially enforceable limits on Congress's power. Indeed, as the next
section will discuss, those limiting elements formed the prevailing understanding of McCulloch in the years leading to the ratification of the
Thirteenth Amendment. Most obviously, Marshall's famous conclusion
begins with the caveat that the end being pursued must be "legitimate"
and "within the scope of the constitution."' Thus, any piece of legislation must be directed toward-and measured against-constitutional
norms. Indeed, later in the opinion, Marshall wrote that "it would be the
[Court's] painful duty" to strike down any law that pursued an end "prohibited by the constitution" or where Congress, "under the pretext of
43. Id. at 413-14.
44. Id. at 423.
45. Id. at 421.
46. Evan Caminker, "Appropriate" Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers, 53
Stan. L. Rev. 1127, 1136 (2001); see also Steven A. Engel, Note, The McCulloch Theory of
the Fourteenth Amendment: City of Boerne v. Hores and the Original Understanding of
Section 5, 109 Yale L.J. 115, 136 (1999) (arguing McCulloch standard "invite[s] substantial
deference to Congress's choice of means in the pursuit of ends recognized by the
Constitution").
47. Caminker, supra note 46, at 1137; see also Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S.
534, 548 (1934) ("[T]he closeness of the relationship between the means adopted and the
end to be attained, are matters for congressional determination alone.").
48. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421; see also Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v.
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2592 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (noting "responsibility to
declare unconstitutional those laws that undermine the structure of government established by the Constitution" because such laws are not "proper"); Gary Lawson & Patricia B.
Granger, The "Proper" Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the
Sweeping Clause, 43 Duke L.J. 267, 271 (1993) (arguing judiciary must ensure legislation
is not only necessary but "proper," that is, consistent with federalism, separation of powers,
and individual rights).
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executing its powers, pass [es] laws for the accomplishment of objects not
entrusted to the Government."49 At the very least, McCulloch envisioned
that the Court would police the outer boundaries of legislative power by
ensuring the constitutional legitimacy of legislative ends.5"
In addition, McCulloch also contains language that contemplates at
least some judicially enforceable constraints on Congress's choice of
means. Despite the disclaimer that the Court would not inquire into the
"degree of... necessity" between Congress's chosen means and constitutional ends,5 1 the opinion set forth a number of objective standards that
Congress's chosen means must satisfy. Means must be "appropriate,"
consistent with both
the "letter and spirit of the constitution," 52 and
"plainly adapted,"5" "really calculated to effect,"54 and "tend [ing] directly
to"55 a legitimate end. David Currie argued that Marshall used this language to signal that "tenuous connections to granted powers will not pass
muster," and that the Court will supervise "the reasonableness of the
means" to ensure their appropriateness. 56 Randy Beck has posited that
these limits "prevent Congress from employing remote means that, by
definition, operate through a lengthy chain of cause and effect relationships.

57

Thus, as Keith Whittington puts it, the view that McCulloch stands for
"'judicial deference to the plausible interpretive acts of Congress"' is in49. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 423. Different commentators have assessed
McCulloch's suggestion of pretext review differently. Some view it as merely a "teas[e]"
which can be satisfied upon showing that the law "is really calculated to effect" a constitutional end. Caminker, supra note 46, at 1136. Others caution that Marshall's reference to
pretext "should not be confused with an investigation of the subjective motives of the legislators." J. Randy Beck, The New Jurisprudence of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 2002
U. Ill. L. Rev. 581, 607 (2002) [hereinafter Beck, New Jurisprudence]. Rather, "the 'pretext' inquiry involves an objective consideration of the nature of the means-end relationship alleged to undergird a statute." Id.
50. See J. Randy Beck, The Heart of Federalism: Pretext Review of Means-End
Relationships, 36 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 407, 427 (2003) [hereinafter Beck, Heart of
Federalism] ("Under McCulloch, courts must accept certain legislative ends as constitutional and reject others as beyond the limits of congressional power.").
51. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 423.
52. Id. at 421.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 423.
55. Id. at 419.
56. David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: State and Congressional
Powers, 1801-1835, 49 U. Chi. L. Rev. 887, 932 (1982); see also Stephen Gardbaum,
Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 795, 815-17 (1996) (noting these
inquiries invite judicial review of "the congressional choice of means as a wholm'); cf. Randy
E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 6 U. Pa.J. Const. L.
183, 209 (2003) (arguing Necessary and Proper Clause is "mandatory" and, "like all other
mandatory provisions, is presumptively enforceable by... the courts").
57. Beck, New Jurisprudence, supra note 49, at 612. Beck suggests that Congress
build a legislative record that "mak[es] the means-end relationship plain." Beck, Heart of
Federalism, supra note 50, at 445.
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complete and misleading.58 Rather, McCulloch was "an emphatic assertion
of judicial authority to resolve contested constitutional issues,"59 while
leaving "factual policy judgments" to Congress. 60 Even the "'appropriate
means' standard se[t] out a fairly clear boundary for 61legislative action,
which the judiciary could then monitor for incursions.
As the following section will discuss, it was this more limited understanding of McCulloch that prevailed in the period between the opinion
and the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment. Indeed, Chief Justice
Marshall himself played a role in shaping this understanding. In a series
of anonymous essays written after the release of McCulloch, Marshall emphasized that the opinion had expressly reserved judicial power to strike
down laws passed "for the accomplishment of objects, not intrusted to
the government."62 He also denied that McCulloch gave Congress unlimited discretion 6 stating that Congress's chosen means may neither be
"remote" nor have only "distant conduciveness to the object." 64 Thus,
Marshall himself asserted that Congress's choice of ends, as well as its
65
choice of means, was subject to judicial review.
B. The Antebellum UnderstandingofMcCulloch
The Supreme Court's application of McCulloch in the remainder of
the antebellum period demonstrates that McCulloch indeed created space
for deferential but meaningful judicial review of both the ends and
means of federal legislation. In those decades, the Supreme Court "was
routinely asked to resolve constitutional questions involving the scope of
the legislative authority of Congress and to enforce constitutional limits
against that coordinate branch."66 In a recent article, Keith Whittington
surveyed cases in which the Supreme Court reviewed federal legislation
during that period. He concluded that the Court "rarely showed much
self-consciousness about exercising its own authority to evaluate the con58. Whittington, Judicial Review, supra note 34, at 1294 (quoting Engel, supra note
46, at 118).
59. Id. at 1294.
60. Keith E. Whittington, The Road Not Taken: Dred Scott, Judicial Authority, and
Political Questions, 63J. Pol. 365, 371 (2001).
61. Id. at 372.
62. Marshall, Union, supra note 30, at 100.
63. See John Marshall, Marshall's "A Friend of the Constitution" Essays [hereinafter
Marshall, Constitution], in John Marshall's Defense of McCulloch v. Maryland, supra note
30, at 184, 186-87 ("In no single instance does the court admit the unlimited power of
congress to adopt any means whatever, and thus to pass the limits prescribed by the constitution.").
64. Marshall, Union, supra note 30, at 100.

65. See also Barnett, supra note 56, at 211-14 (describing early historical understanding of Clause as rejecting notion that "Congress was the sole judge of a measure's necessity
and propriety"); id. at 206-07 ("[A] showing of'necessity' should neither be so 'strict' that
no statute can pass muster nor so lenient that any statute can pass.").
66. Whittington, Judicial Review, supra note 34, at 1325.
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stitutionality of federal legislation, and"-tellingly-"it did not often articulate a standard of review that emphasized an especially high standard
67
of deference to Congress on constitutional issues."
The most important case of the antebellum era for these purposes is
Prigg v. Pennsylvania,' in which the Court affirmed the power of
Congress to pass the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793. Prigg is often cited as a
9
corollary to McCulloch 6-confirmation
that the Court will indeed afford
broad deference to Congress and an indication that Congress's power to
enforce the Thirteenth Amendment should be similarly broad. A close
reading of Prigg,however, confirms that the Court upheld the Act not
primarily out of deference to Congress, but after performing an independent review of the statute. The Court actively reviewed the ends pursued by Congress and deferred only to the unremarkable means chosen
in pursuit of those ends. While the substance of Prigg's constitutional interpretation might well be subject to question, its methodology reveals a
more active and less deferential understanding of the Court's role vis-tvis Congress than one might expect given the modern perception of
McCulloch.
Priggconsidered the Fugitive Slave Clause, which provides:
No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the
Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of
any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service
or Labour, But shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to
70
whom such Service or Labour may be due.
On its face, the Clause is directed at state action, and thus it is possible to regard the Clause only as a "self-executing prohibition on the free
states from interfering with the slave owner's right to recapture his runaway slaves." 71 An alternative, much broader reading of the Clause regards
it as "an affirmative constitutional guarantee of the slaveholder's prop-

67. Id. Whittington suggests that this might well be due less to the text of McCulloch
itself than to the political ascendancy of Jeffersonians and Jacksonians, which rendered
McCulloch politically "dead" and ineffectual until it was "cited and revived by nationalists
after the Civil War." Id. at 1296. Whatever the Court's motives, however, its practice certainly informed public understanding of the relative roles of the Court and Congress.
68. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
69. See Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 Harv. L.
Rev. 26, 85 (2000) [hereinafter Amar, Document] (describing Priag's view of "sweeping
Congressional power" and Reconstruction Amendments framers' reliance on that view);
Robert J. Kaczorowski, The Supreme Court and Congress's Power to Enforce
Constitutional Rights: An Overlooked Moral Anomaly, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 153, 176
(2005) (describing Prigg as similar to McCulloch in that both are "deferential to Congress
and the legislation it enacts in implementing specific provisions of the Constitution.").
70. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.
71. Kaczorowski, supra note 69, at 161; see also Akhil Reed Amar, America's
Constitution: A Biography 261 (2005) ("Article IV pointedly withheld any general authority to implement the 'Service or Labour' clause in free states.").
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erty right of recapture. ' 72 The Clause contains no express grant of
congressional enforcement power, and the scope of any implied enforcement power would depend upon the substantive construction of the
clause itself. Enforcement of the narrow view might permit remedies for
state violations of slaveholders' property rights, 73 while enforcement of
the broad view might permit protection of slaveholders' rights regardless
74
of state action.
The Second Congress passed, and President Washington signed, the
Fugitive Slave Act of 1793. The Act created extradition and rendition
procedures as well as a civil cause of action in which the owner of a fugitive slave could seek damages from "any person who shall knowingly and
willingly obstruct or hinder" the recapture of a fugitive slave. 75 There was
no debate on the question of Congress's power to pass the Act.76 However, by protecting the common law right of recapture, the Second
Congress appears to have embraced the broad view of the individual
right protected by the Fugitive Slave Clause and assumed that it had
power to enforce that right.
In Prigg,the Court affirmed that the Clause "contains a positive and
unqualified recognition of the right of the owner in the slave," including
the right "to seize and recapture his slave." 77 The Court's interpretive
method, however, is revealing. The Court did not defer to Congress's
substantive understanding of the Clause but rather approached the question de novo, looking to the text of the provision "with all the lights and
aids of contemporary history."78 Alluding to McCulloch, the Court then
held that Congress had implied power to enforce the right recognized by
the Clause 79 and indicated that it would defer to Congress's choice of
means with respect to how to enforce that right."0
The enforcement mechanisms created by the Act were fairly standard8l-executive and judicial procedures designed directly to vindicate
72. Kaczorowski, supra note 69, at 163.
73. See id. at 162-63 ("[T]his view would be the most consistent with the state action
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . which limit[s] Congress's legislative
powers to remedying the prohibited state action.").
74. Id. at 163.
75. Act of Feb. 12, 1793 (Fugitive Slave Act of 1793), ch. 7, § 3-4, 1 Stat. 302, 302-05
(repealed 1864).
76. Kaczorowski, supra note 69, at 164. But see Paul Finkelman, Sorting Out Pr'gg v.
Pennsylvania, 24 Rutgers L.J. 605, 620-21 (1993) (arguing existence of state fugitive slave
laws at time of framing shows "the Fugitive Slave Clause was merely an admonition to the
states to return fugitive slaves").
77. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539,613 (1842).
78. Id. at 610.
79. Id. at 616, 619.
80. Id. at 620. The Court also held that Congress's power to enforce the right of
recaption was exclusive, and not concurrent with the states. See id. at 623 (right of recaption is "uncontrolled and uncontrollable by state sovereignty or state legislation").
81. "Standard" in the sense of being typical types of remedies. Obviously, the subject
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the individual right of recapture.8 2 Unsurprisingly, then, the Court held
the Act to be "clearly constitutional, in all its leading provisions."8" However, the Court did not defer wholesale to the remedies chosen by
Congress. It invalidated a portion of the Act that required state magistrates to issue certificates of removal for fugitive slaves upon proof of the
owner's claims. 84 Compelling state officials to enforce federally protected
rights was an "unconstitutional exercise of [Congress's] power of interpretation."8 5 That duty fell exclusively to the *federalgovernment. 86 Thus,
the Court's selective approval of the enforcement mechanisms in the
1793 Act demonstrates that it was prepared to subject even Congress's
choice of means to some baseline of independent judicial review. 7
Prigg provides an important lesson regarding the order in which
Congress and the Court may act. In 1793, the Second Congress did not
have the benefit of judicial interpretation regarding the Fugitive Slave
Clause or Congress's enforcement powers generally. Despite (or perhaps
because of) this lack of definitive guidance, the Second Congress engaged in its own constitutional interpretation, deciding for itself that the
Clause recognized an individual right enforceable by Congress. This sequence demonstrates that Congress need not be reactive to the Court
but can proactively interpret constitutional provisions. At the same time,
though, Prigg demonstrates that when Congress's judgment is challenged, the Court will engage in de novo review of the Constitution's
substantive guarantees. While the Court pointed to Congress's action as
evidence of the original meaning of the Fugitive Slave Clause, it took

matter of these particular remedies-the rendition of human beings into slavery--is anything but ordinary.
82. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (describing extradition and rendition
procedures and remedies available to slaveholders under Act); see also Tennessee v. Lane,
541 U.S. 509, 559 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting one way to enforce constitutional
rights is to "create a cause of action through which the citizen may vindicate" those tights).
83. Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 622.
84. Id. ("[W]ith the exception of that part which confers authority upon state magistrates, [the Act is] free from reasonable doubt and difficulty, upon the grounds already
stated.").
85. Id. at 615-16.
86. Id. at 623 ("[T]he natural, if not the necessary, conclusion is, that the national
government, in the absence of all positive provisions to the contrary, is bound, through its
own proper departments ... to carry into effect all the rights and duties imposed upon it
by the constitution."). This portion of the opinion engendered several separate opinions.
See, e.g., id. at 627-29 (Taney, CJ., dissenting) ("[I]t never has been suggested, that the
states could not uphold and maintain [constitutional rights] .... On the contrary, it has
always been held to be [states'] duty ... to enforce them; and the action of the general
government has never been deemed necessary, except to ... prevent their violation.").
87. The Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 adopted a more draconian enforcement apparatus
than the 1793 Act. See Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, § 6-10, 9 Stat. 462, 463-65 (repealed 1864) (establishing enforcement procedures for recapturing fugitive slaves and
criminal penalties for noncompliance). The Court upheld the 1850 Act in Ableman v.
Booth, 62 U.S. 506, 526 (1859).
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pains to make clear that it engaged in its own independent assessment of
the argument.8
As the next Part discusses, the sponsors of the Civil Rights Act of
1866, the first piece of Section 2 legislation, invoked Priggand McCulloch
in describing the scope of Congress's power under Section 2.89 Modem
commentators have seized on these invocations to argue for an expansive
understanding of Congress's power to enforce the Thirteenth
Amendment. Professor Akhil Amar has argued that Priggand McCulloch's
"view[s] of sweeping congressional power" should form one of the "basic
interpretive ground rules" regarding the scope of Congress's power to
enforce the Reconstruction Amendments. 90 Similarly, Professor Robert
Kaczorowski has argued that Prigg and McCulloch confirm that Congress
has "plenary power to enforce" constitutionally guaranteed rights. 91
The "crucial point" of Prigg, Professor Kaczorowski argues, is the
Court's unanimous holding that where the Constitution secures a right,
"Congress [has] plenary power to enforce [it] and to remedy all violations, even when the constitutional recognition of a right is in the form
of a prohibition against the states from interfering with it."92 Just as the

Fugitive Slave Clause empowered Congress to create private remedies for
violations of the right of recaption, he argues, the Thirteenth
Amendment "delegated plenary power to Congress to enforce 93liberty" by
"defin [ing] and secur [ing] the civil liberties of all Americans."
Kaczorowski's assessment of Priggjuxtaposes the private cause of action created by the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 with the state action-oriented text of the Fugitive Slave Clause. This shows, Kaczorowski argues,
that Congress's enforcement power permits broad-ranging remedies
against actors not explicitly mentioned in the constitutional text.94 This
argument, however, does not square with the constitutional analysis in
Prigg The Court held that the Clause in fact recognized and protected
slave owners' individual property rights, despite its text. 95 The broad
88. See, e.g., Prigg,41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 622-23 ("But we do not wish to rest our present opinion upon the ground either of contemporaneous exposition, or long acquiescence, or even practical action ....On the contrary, our judgment would be the same, if
the question were entirely new, and the act of congress were of recent enactment.").
89. See infra Part II.B (describing use of McCulloch and Priggin debates over 1866
Civil Rights Act).
90. Amar, Document, supra note 69, at 85.
91. Kaczorowski, supra note 69, at 179.
92. Id. at 184.
93. Id. at 210-11.
94. See id. at 184 (stating that Congress has "plenary power to enforce [constitutionally secured rights] and to remedy all violations, even when the constitutional recognition
of a right is in the form of a prohibition against the states from interfering with it").
95. See Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 622 (1842) ("[T]he right to seize
and retake fugitive slaves, and the duty to deliver them up .. .and of course the corresponding power in Congress to use the appropriate means to enforce the right and duty,
derive their whole validity and obligation exclusively from the Constitution.")
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scope of the constitutional right, as interpreted by the Court, dictated
96
the broad scope of permissible remedies that Congress could create.
Prigg also does not support Kaczorowski's characterization of
Congress's power as "plenary." The term "plenary" refers to complete,
unreviewable power. 97 While Priggcertainly acknowledged broad congressional enforcement power, 98 it was far from plenary. The Court's de novo
review of Congress's substantive interpretation of the Fugitive Slave
Clause, and its decision to strike down the Act's requirement that state
magistrates issue certificates of removal, show that the Court perceived
judicially enforceable limits on Congress's discretion, both with respect
to Congress's choice of means and definition of ends. 99 These limits undermine Kaczorowski's claim that Prigg supports a Thirteenth
Amendment power to "define and secure the civil liberties of all
Americans." 00
Professor Amar acknowledges that neither Prigg nor Section 2 conveyed "plenary" power on Congress.101 He also asserts, quite correctly,
that Priggrecognized broad power "to protect slave masters, even in legislation over private parties."10 2 However, his conclusion that Congress
should have "power to protect ex-slaves" that is "equally broad" as the
power approved in Prige 3 requires clarification. A Priggbased reading of
the Section 2 power indicates that Congress has broad power to prevent
and remedy conduct that violates the judicially determined parameters of
14
the right conveyed by Section 1, namely, freedom from coerced labor.
Prigg does not, however, suggest that Section 2 gives Congress power to
address civil rights generally or to protect individuals who are not at risk
96. See id. at 619 ("The end being required, it has been deemed ajust and necessary
implication, that the means to accomplish it are given also; or, in other words, that the
power flows as a necessary means to accomplish the end.").
97. See Black's Law Dictionary 1273 (9th ed. 2009) ("Full; complete; entire.");
Oxford English Dictionary 1093 (1989) ("Complete, entire, perfect; not deficient in any
element or respect.").
98. See Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 620 (rejecting "limited construction of the
Constitution" and noting Congress "has, on various occasions, exercised powers which
were necessary and proper means to carry into effect rights expressly given, and duties
expressly enjoined thereby").
99. See id. ("These cases are... to show that the rule of interpretation, insisted upon
at the argument, is quite too narrow to provide for the ordinary exigencies of the national
government, in cases where rights are intended to be absolutely secured, and duties are
positively enjoined by the Constitution.").
100. Kaczorowski, supra note 69, at 211.
101. See Amar, Document, supra note 69, at 108 (observing Congress's power to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments "is not plenary-wholly plenary power is hard to
reconcile with the basic structure of enumerated power that the Reconstruction
Amendments accept rather than repudiate").
102. Id. at 71.
103. Id.
104. See McAward, Defining, supra note 16, at 625-26 (critiquing Civil Rights Cases
and arguing that Civil Rights Act of 1875 was valid under Section 2).
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of Section 1 violations. While other constitutional provisions may well
give Congress more sweeping power, 10 5 the Section 2 power, even read in
light of Prigg,has a more limited scope.
Thus, while one can agree that McCulloch and Prigg are relevant to
the scope of the Section 2 power, a close reading of those opinions supports only certain propositions. First, Congress may precede the Court in
interpreting the substantive scope of constitutional guarantees. Second,
any such interpretation is informative, but not dispositive, to the Court's
independent review of the question. And third, Congress has broad but
not unlimited power to choose the means by which to remedy violations
of constitutional rights. In other words, the scope of the legislative power
identified in Priggand the role of the Court in reviewing its exercise are
precisely what one might expect given McCulloch: active judicial review of
the ends pursued by Congress and deferential but meaningful judicial
review of the means chosen by Congress. It was this set of understandings
about the relationship between Congress and the Court that formed the
backdrop for the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment.
II. THE MCCULLOCHORIGINS OF SECTION 2

McCulloch and Prigg were well known to those who debated the
Thirteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the first piece
of legislation proposed under Section 2 of the Amendment. The scope of
the Section 2 power did not receive much attention during the ratification debates, but it was a focal point of the debates over the Act, during
which the Act's supporters invoked McCulloch and Prigg in describing the
power of Congress under Section 2. This Part explores the historical record in an effort to understand precisely how the framers of Section 2 understood those cases and envisioned the relative roles of Congress and
the Court in enforcing the Thirteenth Amendment. 10 6
A. The Text and Ratification Understandingof Section 2
The text of the Thirteenth Amendment itself was modeled on legal
sources well known to the framers. Section 1 draws from the language of
the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 and declares that "[n]either slavery

105. Indeed, Professor Amar's Prigg argument has focused primarily on Congress's
power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment's Citizenship Clause. See Amar, Document,
supra note 69, at 71, 105 (suggesting Citizenship Clause gave Congress "power to enact
certain laws designed to affirm that blacks were equal citizens, worthy of respect and dignity").
106. Although the main argument of this Article focuses on the original public meaning of Section 2, most "originalist" Thirteenth Amendment scholarship has focused primarily on the congressional debates. See, e.g., Kaczorowski, supra note 69, at 201-11
(discussing Senator Trumbull's explanation of Thirteenth Amendment). In order to
evaluate this scholarship, and because the debates are at least relevant to determining
original public meaning, this section focuses on those same debates.
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nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the
party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States,
or any place subject to their jurisdiction" 10 7 Section 2's declaration that
"Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation"'1 8 alludes to McCulloch, in which the Supreme Court held that
Congress may "select any appropriate means" by which to effectuate its
enumerated powers. °9
Representative James F. Wilson proposed the enforcement language
of Section 2 but did not explain its intended scope."' Although no records remain from the deliberations of the Judiciary Committee that
drafted the Thirteenth Amendment,"' two comments made during the
ratification debates by Senator Lyman Trumbull, the committee's chairman, suggest that he envisioned a link between "appropriate" legislation
and the McCulloch standard, After noting that Section 2 gives Congress
112
the power to enforce the amendment with "proper" legislation,
Trumbull later described Congress's power as that "to pass such laws as
may be necessary to carry [the ban on slavery and involuntary servitude]
These comments, which use the terms "necessary,"
into effect.""'
"proper," and "appropriate" interchangeably, certainly suggest that the
power to pass appropriate legislation was akin to the power conferred on
Congress by the Necessary and Proper Clause, as explicated in
McCulloch. 4
Most commentators read this history to say that Section 2 incorporates the McCulloch standard." 5 Some then regard this as conclusive evi107. U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § 1; accord Northwest Ordinance of 1787, art. VI, 1
Stat. 51 n.(a) ("There shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in the said territory, otherwise than in punishment of crimes, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted."); Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1488 (1864) (noting extent to which proposed amendment tracked Jeffersonian ordinance).
108. U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § 2.
109. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 410 (1819).
110. Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1863).
111. See Michael Vorenberg, Final Freedom: The Civil War, the Abolition of Slavery,
and the Thirteenth Amendment 53 (Christopher Tomlins ed., 2001) ("It is difficult to
reconstruct the committee's deliberations because no record of them survives.").
112. Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 553 (1864) (statement of Sen. Lyman
Trumbull).
113. Id. at 1313.
114. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 423 (using "appropriate" to describe scope of Congress's
power under Necessary and Proper Clause); see supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text
(describing McCulloch).
115. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 747, 825 n.299
(1999) [hereinafter Amar, Intratextualism] (describing how Representative Wilson quoted
"verbatim Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment and then explicitly link[ed] its wording
to the key words from McCulloch"); Balkin, supra note 6, at 1810 ("When Congress
adopted the Reconstruction Amendments, it was generally accepted that grants of
");
congressional power in Article I were subject to the test of McCulloch v. Maryland ...
Caminker, supra note 46, at 1159-65 (describing how framing debates indicate Section 2's

1786

COLUMBIA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 112:1769

dence that Congress has plenary power to enforce the Thirteenth
Amendment.' 16 However, linking McCulloch to the text of Section 2 does
not necessarily resolve the respective roles of Congress and the Court in
enforcing the Thirteenth Amendment. Rather, it simply raises the question of precisely how the scope of congressional power under McCulloch
and Priggwas understood at the time of the Thirteenth Amendment.
The congressional ratification debates occasioned no sustained reflection on Section 2.117 Congress's enforcement power received greater
attention in the state ratification debates, however, where the amendment's opponents objected that Congress would use its power to "emasculate" the states. 118 Whether motivated by genuine federalism-based
concerns or by a raw desire to preserve white supremacy, the states of the
former confederacy were united in their concern about the scope of
Congress's power." 9 South Carolina's delegates engaged in an interesting colloquy with Secretary of State William Seward on this point. The
state's delegates were fearful "that the second section may be construed
to give Congress power of local legislation over the Negroes, and white
men, too, after the abolishment of slavery." 12 Seward responded that
Section 2 "is really restraining in its effect, instead of enlarging the pow1
ers of Congress.''
It is not clear whether Seward's message described his true understanding of Section 2 or was merely a strategic ploy to obtain ratification
of the Amendment. If the former, his statement provides at least some
evidence that Section 2 was not meant to provide Congress with expansive enforcement power. If the latter, Seward was successful but not entirely reassuring. South Carolina did ratify the amendment but issued its
own declaration that "any attempt by Congress toward legislating upon
the political status of former slaves, or their civil relations, would be contrary to the Constitution of the United States, as it now is, or as it would

use of "appropriate" was "selected with the McCulloch standard in mind").
116. See, e.g., Kaczorowski, supra note 69, at 212 (describing Senator Trumbull's
view that "Congress had to have the same plenary power to enforce the constitutional
rights that inhere in a state of freedom as it had to enforce the constitutional rights of
slave owners").
117. See McAward, Scope, supra note 15, at 103 ("[Q]uestions regarding... the extent of Congress's power under Section 2 generally received scant analysis.").
118. Vorenberg, supra note 111, at 218 (citing William H. Green, Speech on the
Proposed Amendment of the Federal Constitution, Abolishing Slavery 9 (1865)); see also
id. (noting detractors in Ohio and Indiana claimed Congress would use its Section 2 powers to "rewrite state constitutions or abolish state courts and state legislatures").

119. Id. at 230 (quoting Mississippi's objection that Section 2 provided "dangerous
grant of power").
120. Alexander Tsesis, The Thirteenth Amendment and American Freedom 48
(2004).
121. Vorenberg, supra note 111, at 229 (quoting Message from the President of the
United States, S. Exec. Doc. No. 39-26, at 198 (1866)).
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Louisiana isbe altered by the proposed amendment.' 22 Alabama and
2
sued similar reservations as they ratified the Amendment.
The legal effect of these reservations is unclear in light of subsequent state ratification votes. At the very least, however, the Seward colloquy and the reservations demonstrate that Section 2 was not universally
understood as an expansive grant of congressional power at the time of
ratification.
B. Section 2 and the Civil Rights Act of 1866
Shortly after the Thirteenth Amendment was ratified, the ThirtyNinth Congress began considering what would become the Civil Rights
Act of 1866. The debates over the Act included substantial reflection on
Congress's Section 2 power. Passed over President Johnson's veto, lingering doubts about the adequacy of Congress's power to pass the Act led to
the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment and the subsequent reenactment of the Act in 1870.124
The impetus for the Act was the southern states' enactment of Black
Codes. 125 Mississippi and South Carolina were the first to pass such codes
126
in 1865, and the rest of the southern states soon followed suit. Many of
the codes contained explicit racial classifications, requiring black workers
to sign annual labor contracts and providing that they would be subject
to arrest and forfeiture of the entirety of their annual wages if they left
before the contract's term. 12 7 Some laws forbade blacks from renting
land in urban areas and others limited blacks to the occupations of
farmer and servant. 28 The primary goal of the Black Codes was to restrict
the freedmen's available labor options in order to "ge[t] things back as
129
near to slavery as possible."

122. Id. at 230 (citing 2 U.S. Dep't of State, Documentary History of the Constitution
of the United States of America 1787-1870, at 606 (1894)).
123. See Herman Belz, A New Birth of Freedom 159 (2d ed. 2000) (listing states that
declared Congress had no power to legislate on political status or civil relations of former
slaves).
124. For an elaboration on the history of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, see McAward,
Scope, supra note 15, at 108-14 (describing debates over Section 2 power to counteract
Black Codes in certain states).
125. See id. (noting Act "took direct aim at the southern Black Codes").
126. Id. at 108.
127. See Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1866) (describing variety of state
Black Codes); see also Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution,
1863-1877, at 199 (2002) ("[The Black Codes'] centerpiece was the attempt to stabilize
the black work force and limit its economic options apart from plantation labor.").
128. See Foner, supra note 127, at 200 (describing Black Codes).
129. Id. at 199 (quoting Letter from Benjamin F. Flanders to Henry C. Warmoth
(Nov. 23, 1865), in Henry Clay Warmoth Papers, 1798-1953, microformed on Collection
No. 00752, The Wilson Library, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (S. Historical
Collection)).

1788

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 112:1769

On January 5, 1866, Senator Lyman Trumbull, chair of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, proposed what ultimately became the Civil Rights
Act of 1866.130 As enacted, the first section of the Act provides:
[A]ll persons born in the United States and not subject to any
foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States; and such citizens, of
every race and color ...shall have the same right, in every State
and Territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase,
lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to
full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and
shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to
none other, any law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, or custom,
3
to the contrary notwithstanding.1 '
The second section declared that anyone who, acting under color of law,
violated rights secured by the first section was guilty of a misdemeanor. 132
The remaining sections adopted the enforcement structure of the
Fugitive Slave Law of 1850, vesting jurisdiction over such misdemeanors
in the U.S. district courts and providing concurrent jurisdiction over
state court cases involving persons who were unable to enforce in state
33
court the rights guaranteed by the first section.'
There was substantial uncertainty in the Thirty-Ninth Congress as to
whether Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment provided Congress adequate authority to pass the bill. Opponents argued that because Section
1 of the Amendment abolished slavery, the end pursued by any enforcement legislation must be the demise of "the status or condition of slavery."' 34 They argued that appropriate legislation would have a tight
means-ends fit, like laws providing the privilege of habeas corpus for any
person held as a slave.'3 5 The Civil Rights Act was not appropriate legislation because it "confer[red] civil rights which are wholly distinct and unconnected with the status or condition of slavery"'16 and conferred these
rights on people of all races, not just the slaves freed by Section 1. Therefore the Act lacked a "logical and legal connection" to the
Amendment.'3 7
Unlike most opponents of the Act, who would have been content
with its defeat, Representative John Bingham supported the substantive
rights conveyed by the Act, regarding them as natural rights belonging to

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 129 (1866).
Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27.
Id. § 2.
Cong. Globe, 39th.Cong., 1st Sess. 475 (1866).
Id. at 476 (statement of Sen. Willard Saulsbury, Sr.).
Id. at 499 (statement of Sen. Edgar Cowan).
Id. at 476 (statement of Sen. Willard Saulsbury, Sr.).
Id.
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all citizens."s However, in his view, Section 2 did not empower Congress
to "reform the whole civil and criminal code of every State government."'3 9 Thus, Bingham voted against the Act 40 but recommended the
passage of what would become the Fourteenth Amendment in order to
shore up the constitutional basis of the rights conveyed by the Act.""
The Act's sponsors and supporters, particularly Senator Trumbull
and Representative Wilson, mounted a two-pronged defense of the Act.
They defended it both as appropriate prophylactic legislation under
Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment to protect the rights of former
slaves, and as an exercise of Congress's implied power under McCulloch to
enforce the natural rights of all citizens. 42 Viewed as a whole, their arguments reveal a clear view of how they understood Section 2 to operate as
well as important insights on how McCulloch and Priggrelate to the scope
of congressional power.
For Section 2 purposes, supporters characterized the Act as an abrogation of the Black Codes, passed on behalf of "persons who are liable to
be reduced to a condition of slavery."' 43 Trumbull and Wilson agreed
with their critics that the end that Congress could pursue under Section
2 was "defined by the Constitution itself""-specifically, to give "effect to
45
the great declaration that slavery shall not exist in the United States,"'
and to "maintai[n] ... freedom."1 46 The real point of departure between
the Act's supporters and opponents was on the question of what means
were appropriate to that end. As Trumbull described, Congress's chosen
means was the elimination of the Black Codes, which instituted "the very
restrictions which were imposed . . . in consequence of the existence of
slavery,"' 47 even if they did "not make a man an absolute slave."148 Thus,
the Act required equal protection of the same civil rights the Black Codes
had denied to African Americans. 49 Wilson explained that the bill's
138. Id. at 429-30 (statement of Rep. John Bingham).
139. Id. at 1293.
140. See id. at 1367.
141. See id. at 1291-93 ("I should remedy [discrimination] not by an arbitrary
assumption of power, but by amending the Constitution of the United States, expressly
prohibiting the States from any such abuse of power in the future.").
142. See, e.g., id. at 1117-18 (statement of Rep. James F. Wilson) (noting "it is not
the object of this bill to establish new rights, but to protect and enforce those which
already belong to every citizen" and contending Congress decides necessity of
enforcement measures under McCulloch).
143. Id. at app. 157 (statement of Rep.James F. Wilson).
144. Id. at 1118.
145. Id. at 474 (statement of Sen. Lyman Trumbull).
146. Id. at 1118 (statement of Rep.James F. Wilson); see also id. at 475 (statement of
Sen. Lyman Trumbull) (noting "end in view" is to "secure freedom to all people in the
United States").
147. Id. at 474 (statement of Sen. Lyman Trumbull).
148. Id. at 475.
149. See id. (describing how various discriminatory state laws violated rights of free-
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means were appropriate to the end because "[a] man who enjoys the civil
rights mentioned in this bill cannot be reduced to slavery." 150 In other
words, the Act's supporters defended it as a prophylactic measure, passed
on behalf of former slaves and with a close causal relationship between
the rights protected and the end of securing the demise of slavery.
Trumbull and Wilson defended Congress's power to make this
causal assessment. According to Trumbull, Section 2 conveyed to
Congress the "right to pass any law which, in our judgment, is deemed
appropriate, and which will accomplish the end in view, secure freedom
to all people in the United States.' 1 5 1 He emphasized that what is "appropriate legislation" for Section 2 purposes "is for Congress to determine,
and nobody else.' 52 Wilson specifically invoked McCulloch as providing
the guiding principle for how the Section 2 power "shall . . . be exercised." 153 After quoting McCulloch, he asserted that the enforcement
mechanisms utilized by the Act were certainly "appropriate" to safeguard
"those rights which . . .are [a citizen's] sure defense against efforts to
reduce him to slavery[.] . . . This settles the appropriateness of this
measure, and that settles its constitutionality. Of the necessity of the
15 4
measure Congress is the sole judge.
Trumbull and Wilson also propounded a non-Thirteenth
Amendment constitutional defense of the Act, likely in response to concerns that the rights conveyed by the first section of the Act extended
beyond the freed slaves to northern blacks and white people who were
not at risk of re-enslavement. 155 They characterized the rights protected
by the first section as the natural rights of citizens, pointing to the
Declaration of Independence and the Privileges and Immunities Clause
(as interpreted in Corfield v. Coryel1156) for support. 157 Neither man remen).
150. Id. at 1118 (statement of Rep. James F. Wilson); see also id. (claiming Section 2
is sufficient basis for Act insofar as it protects "citizens who may be in danger of being subjected to slavery or involuntary servitude"); id. at 503-04 (statement of Sen. Jacob
Howard) (arguing it would make "mockery of emancipation" to leave Congress without
power to assist those who had been denied "family ... property .... [and] the right to
acquire or use any instrumentalities of carrying on the industry of which he may be capable").
151. Id. at 475 (statement of Sen. Lyman Trumbull).
152. Id. at 43. Trumbull also acknowledged limits to this proposition, repeatedly disclaiming the intention (and implicitly the power) to legislate with respect to the "political
rights or status of parties." Id. at 476. Wilson, too, disclaimed the right of Congress to legislate regarding suffrage, jury service, or the right to attend racially integrated schools. Id. at
1117 (statement of Rep. James F. Wilson).
153. Id. at 1118.
154. Id.
155. See id. (prefacing natural citizenship rights argument with acknowledgment
that "this bill may have a broader application ...which would reach the cases of persons
designed to be protected by the [Amendment]").
156. 6 F. Cas. 546 (Washington, CircuitJustice, C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
157. See Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474-75 (statement of Sen. Lyman
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flected on whether Congress had the power to define the rights of citizenship, but focused instead on its power to protect those rights. On that
point, Wilson invoked both McCulloch and Prigg to demonstrate that
58
Congress in fact had such power.
The dual arguments offered in support of the Act provide some insight as to both the nature of the Section 2 power as well as the role of
McCulloch and Prigg in Reconstruction-era congressional thinking. The
Thirteenth Amendment defense of the Act was limited in scope, emphasizing that the bill was a prophylactic measure designed to secure the
freedom of the former slaves by vitiating the Black Codes. Trumbull and
Wilson made no claim that McCulloch empowered Congress to interpret
the substantive ends that Congress could pursue under Section 2, much
less to opine on substantive questions of citizenship and rights. 15 9 Rather,
they invoked McCulloch and Prigg with respect to Congress's power to
craft effective enforcement mechanisms, arguing that those cases gave
Congress discretion to utilize a broad range of protective and remedial
means, not just those directly and indispensably related to constitutional
ends.
On this latter point, Trumbull and Wilson did assert repeatedly that,
under McCulloch, Congress is the sole judge of the necessity of enforcement legislation. This interpretation, however, does not necessarily describe how a reasonable observer would have understood McCulloch in
1866. Priggwould have informed expectations as to how McCulloch would
apply in operation, and Priggdemonstrated that Congress has broad but
not complete discretion with respect to its choice of means, and that the
Court does not defer completely to Congress's enforcement choices. Indeed, Trumbull and Wilson both pointed out that the Act was efficacious
in securing the demise of slavery, a justification they would not have had
to offer if it were universally understood that Congress was the solejudge
of necessity. Thus, Trumbull's and Wilson's invocations of McCulloch do
Trumbull) (exploring sources defining natural liberty). The Act's supporters also articulated several theories in support of the citizenship provision of the Act. For example,
Trumbull himself argued both that this provision was either declaratory of the status of
persons born in the United States, see id. at 527, or a valid action under the Naturalization
Clause, see id. at 475. But opponents in Congress disagreed, see id. at 497, 504 (statements
of Sen. Peter Van Winkle & Sen. ReverdyJohnson) (arguing only additional constitutional
amendment could make "persons of the negro race" citizens).
158. Id. at 1118, 2512 (statements of Rep.James F. Wilson) (declaring McCulloch provides Congress discretion to choose means and Prig "declared that the possession of the
right carries with it the power to provide a remedy").
159. Professor Kaczorowski argues that the first section of the Act demonstrates that
the Thirty-Ninth Congress understood Section 2 to empower Congress to define and confer civil rights as well as to enforce and protect them. Kaczorowski, supra note 69, at 225
(noting Wilson's statement that "the right to exercise this power [to pass the Civil Rights
Act] . . . runs with the rights it is designed to protect" (emphasis omitted)). However, this
argument conflates the Section 2 defense of the bill with the natural rights defense of the
bill. Wilson and Trumbull did not use Section 2 to justify their substantive efforts to define
the rights of citizens.
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not necessarily represent the prevailing view of that case in 1866, and
were broader than necessary to sustain Congress's choice of means in the
Act.
C. JudicialInterpretationofSection 2
The Supreme Court consistently has invoked McCulloch as providing
the proper framework forjudicial review of Section 2 legislation. The way
in which the Court has applied McCulloch, however, has varied. In the
decades immediately following the ratification of the Thirteenth
Amendment, the Court did not hesitate to evaluate the ends and sometimes even the means of Section 2 legislation.' 6° Since the late 1960s,
however, the Court has held that McCulloch deference applies to
Congress's definition of the badges and incidents of slavery, as well as
61
Congress's determination regarding how to address them.'
The first case to address the Section 2 power was United States v.
Rhodes.16 2 Justice Noah Swayne, riding circuit, upheld the Civil Rights Act
of 1866, stating that McCulloch demonstrated "the spirit in which the
[Thirteenth] [A]mendment is to be interpreted, and develop[ed] fully
the principles to be applied" in evaluating Section 2 legislation.' 63 Thus,
in order to "abolish slavery" and "guard... against the recurrence of the
evil," Section 2 "authorizes congress to select.., the means that might be
deemed appropriate to the end. . . . Any exercise of legislative power
within its limits involves a legislative, and not ajudicial question. It is only
when the authority given has been clearly exceeded, that the judicial
164
power can be invoked."
Swayne thus defined the constitutional "end" as the prevention of
slavery itself. He noted the deference due to Congress's choice of means,
but also preserved a role for the judiciary to police the outer boundaries
of the Section 2 power. 165 Moreover, he noted the close causal link between the Act and the end sanctioned by Section 1: "Blot out this act and
deny the constitutional power to pass it, and the worst effects of slavery
might speedily follow. It would be a virtual abrogation of the amend66
ment."1
160. See infra notes 162-183 and accompanying text (discussing Court's treatment of
Section 2 legislation until mid-twentieth century).
161. See infra notes 183-189 and accompanying text (recounting change in Court jurisprudence with Jones).
162. 27 F. Cas. 785 (Swayne, CircuitJustice, C.C.D. Ky. 1866) (No. 16,151).
163. Id. at 792.
164. Id. at 793.
165. Cf. United States v. Cruikshank, 25 F. Cas. 707 (Bradley, Circuit Justice, C.C.D.
La. 1874) (No. 14,897) (holding Enforcement Act of 1870 was not valid under Section 2
because it protected all persons against certain conspiracies, whereas Section 1 permitted
only legislation on behalf of "colored citizens"), affd on other grounds, 92 U.S. 542
(1876).
166. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. at 764. The Supreme Court in fact did hold that Congress
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United States v. Harris,decided in 1883, marked the Court's first collective consideration of Congress's Section 2 power.16 7 The case involved
a challenge to the second section of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, which
provided criminal penalties for conspiracies to deprive "any person or
class of persons," regardless of race, "of the equal protection of the laws,
'
Interestingly, the
or of equal privileges or immunities under the laws."168
Court cited McCulloch only for the proposition that "every valid act 1of
69
Congress must find in the Constitution some warrant for its passage,"
thus indicating that McCulloch supported judicial review of congressional
enforcement legislation.
The Court stated that Section 2 empowered Congress "to protect all
persons .. .in the enjoyment of that freedom which it was the object of
the amendment to secure."1 70 However, because the Civil Rights Act covered conspiracies against white people and persons who were never enslaved, the Court concluded that the Act "clearly cannot be authorized by
the amendment which simply prohibits slavery and involuntary servitude.'' l1 l Thus, the Court articulated its own sense of the ends sanctioned
by the Thirteenth Amendment and determined that the means utilized
by the Civil Rights Act were insufficiently related to those ends.
Ten months later, in the Civil Rights Cases,1 72 the Court struck down
the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which had guaranteed "the full and equal
enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges
of inns, public conveyances on land or water, theatres, or other places of
public amusement" regardless of race.1 73 The Court held that neither the
Thirteenth nor Fourteenth Amendment empowered Congress to pass
174
the law.
Writing for the majority, Justice Bradley asserted that Section 1 of
the Thirteenth Amendment not only "abolished slavery" but also "established . . .universal civil and political freedom throughout the United
States.'17' Although he did not specifically cite McCulloch, he indicated
that Congress's Section 2 power tracked its power under the Necessary
and Proper Clause and "clothes Congress with power to pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the
United States."'1 76 This formulation marks the first appearance of the conlacked power to pass the 1866 Act in Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 16, 19-20
(1906), but that ruling was overruled by Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 329 U.S. 409 (1963).
167. 106 U.S. 629 (1883).
168. Ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13, 13.
169. Harris,106 U.S. at 635-36.
170. Id. at 640.
171. Id. at 641.
172. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
173. Ch. 114, § 1, 18 Stat. 335, 336.
174. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 26.
175. Id. at 20.
176. Id.; see also id. at 21 (stating under Section 2, Congress has "a right to enact all
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cept of the "badges and incidents of slavery" in Thirteenth Amendment
jurisprudence. 177 Even more notably, this formulation identifies the
elimination of the badges and incidents of slavery, and notjust of slavery
itself, as a permissible end under Section 2.
For Justice Bradley, this expanded understanding of ends was not
particularly consequential, as his definition of the badges and incidents
of slavery excluded "[m] ere [private] discriminations on account of race
or color," such as those prohibited by the 1875 Act. 178 Thus, in terms of
methodology, the majority engaged in searching review of the ends targeted by Congress and struck down the Act because it pursued an end
not sanctioned by the Thirteenth Amendment.
Justice Harlan dissented, but his methodology did not differ substantially from the majority's. Invoking Prigg,he argued that "for the protection of rights guaranteed by the Constitution, [Congress] may employ
such means, not prohibited, as are necessary and proper, or such as are
appropriate, to attain the ends proposed.' '1 79 Justice Harlan agreed with
the majority that the end toward which Congress can legislate under
Section 2 is "the eradication, not simply of the institution [of slavery], but
of its badges and incidents."' Harlan differed from the majority in his
definition of that concept, which in his view included discrimination by
"such individuals and corporations as exercise public functions and wield
power and authority under the State." 181 He accordingly found the 1875
Act to be appropriate legislation within the meaning of Section 2.182
Thus, all of the Justices in the Civil Rights Cases viewed McCulloch, the
Necessary and Proper Clause, or both as providing the framework for
understanding the scope of the Section 2 power. Yet neither the majority
nor the dissent asserted that McCulloch required deference to Congress
with respect to identifying the permissible ends of Thirteenth
Amendment enforcement legislation. Rather, both opinions independently assessed the scope of the right conveyed by the Amendment
and the definition of the badges and incidents of slavery. Only Justice

necessary and proper laws for the obliteration and prevention of slavery").
177. See McAward, Defining, supra note 16, at 570 (noting first use of term in Civil
Rights Cases).
178. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 25. Justice Bradley stated that the aim of the
Thirteenth Amendment was to eliminate legal restraints on "those fundamental rights
which appertain to the essence of citizenship," including compulsory service, restraint of
movement, "disability to hold property, to make contracts, to have a standing in court, to
be a witness against a white person, and such like burdens and incapacities." Id. at 22. He
also stated that "[i]t would be running the slavery argument into the ground to make it
apply to every act of discrimination which a person may see fit to make." Id. at 24.
179. Id. at 29 (Harlan,J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 35; cf. id. at 36 (recognizing Congress may not "define and regulate the
entire body of the civil rights which citizens enjoy").
181. Id. at 36.
182. Id. at 51.
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Harlan discussed the role of McCulloch deference in any depth, and he
83
acknowledged that it was limited to Congress's choice of means.'
Thus, in the two decades following the ratification of the Thirteenth
Amendment, the Court utilized a consistent methodology in evaluating
Section 2 legislation. While the Court acknowledged that McCulloch
mandated deference with respect to Congress's choice of means, the
Court did not understand those cases as constraining it from engaging in
an independent assessment of the ends sanctioned by the Amendment,
the meaning of the concept of the badges and incidents of slavery, or
even some baseline review of Congress's choice of means. The Court
showed little, if any, hesitation in declaring that Section 2 did not empower Congress to protect certain racial groups (e.g., white people) or to
punish private acts of discrimination."8 4
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., decided in 1968, marked a major shift in
approach to Section 2.185 In that case, the Court upheld the
Court's
the
property conveyance provisions of the 1866 Act as "appropriate legislation," accepting that McCulloch governed the scope of its review. 8 6 However, it made an interesting analytical move regarding the ends that
Congress can pursue under Section 2. The Court explicitly refused to
consider whether Section 1 did anything more than "'abolish[] slavery,
and establish[] universal freedom,"' but embraced the holding of the
Civil Rights Cases that Section 2 "empowered Congress to do much more,"
namely, "'pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and
incidents of slavery in the United States.""8 7 Essentially, the Court
acknowledged that there is a meaningful difference between the abolition of slavery and the abolition of the badges and incidents of slavery.
But it treated the latter as a legitimate legislative end under Section 2,
even though that end was not explicitly sanctioned by Section 1 of the
Amendment. The Court also held that it would defer on two levels to legislation addressing the badges and incidents of slavery. First, it would review solely for rationality Congress's substantive "determin[ation] what
are the badges and the incidents of slavery."' 8 8 Second, it would accord
the same level of deference to Congress's decision how "to translate that
determination into effective legislation."' 89 Thus, the Jones Court held
183. See id. (arguing Congress's role is to decide whether legislation is "best adapted

to the end to be attained").
184. See, e.g., supra note 171 and accompanying text (noting Court's rationale in
striking down 1871 Civil Rights Act as beyond scope of Section 2 power because it covered
whites and blacks who were never slaves).
185. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).

186. Id. at 439-40.
187. Id. at 439 (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20 (majority opinion)).
188. Id. at 440.

189. Id. The Court endorsed Congress's finding that the property developer's racebased refusal to sell property was a badge and incident of slavery, and that banning such
conduct was a rational way to address that relic of slavery. Id. at 442-43.

1796

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 112:1769

that it would defer to Congress's assessment not only of appropriate
means but also of substantive ends under the Thirteenth Amendment.
D. McCulloch, Jones, and Section 5 of the FourteenthAmendment
While Jones remains the governing standard for Thirteenth
Amendment legislation,19 ° the Court has tightened its review of legislation passed under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the text of
which is virtually identical to Section 2.91 In City of Boerne v. Flores, the
Court asserted that it alone has power to "determine what constitutes a
constitutional violation," and therefore to set the ends that Congress can
pursue legislatively. 9 2 Boerne also created a framework under which the
Court will evaluate the fit between statutory means and constitutional
ends. It will ask whether there is "a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to
1 93
that end."
94
Many have criticized Boerne's reinvigoration of the judicial role,1
while others defend it as "the first modern reiteration . . . of time-honored constitutional and remedial principles."1 95 While a full evaluation of
Boerne is well beyond the scope of this piece, it is possible to read Boerne
simply as the Court's effort to apply in the Fourteenth Amendment context the understanding of McCulloch that prevailed during the antebellum and Reconstruction eras. 196 The Court's assertion of interpretive supremacy, acknowledgment of Congress's "wide latitude" in determining
190. See United States v. Beebe, 807 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1049 (D.N.M. 2011) ('Jones remains the controlling relevant precedent in interpreting Section Two of the Thirteenth
Amendment.").
191. Compare U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."), with id. amend. XIII, § 2
("Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.").
192. 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997).
193. Id. at 520.
194. See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 46, at 1133 ("[W]hile Boerne itself.., might be
explicable on narrow grounds, the other statutory provisions invalidated in Boerne's wake
should have been upheld.. . ."); Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation:
A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 153, 165 (1997) (arguing Boernelimited Congress "to enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment as construed by the Court").
195. Marci A. Hamilton & David A. Schoenbrod, The Reaffirmation of
Proportionality Analysis Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 21 Cardozo L.
Rev. 469, 470 (1999); see also Beck, Heart of Federalism, supra note 50, at 409 (arguing
Boerne's "analytical framework implements McCulloch's promise to strike down pretextual
exercises of Congressional power"); Ronald D. Rotunda, The Powers of Congress Under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment After City of Boerne v. Flores, 32 Ind. L. Rev. 163,
190 (1998) (praising Boerneas proof that limits exist on Congress's Section 5 power).
196. Admittedly, the Court did not frame its analysis in these terms but rather examined the ratification history of the Fourteenth Amendment for evidence of intent to expand Congress's substantive interpretive power. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520-24 (reading
legislative history as confirming remedial, rather than substantive, nature of Section 5).
But see Engel, supra note 46, at 117 (questioning majority's reading of legislative history).
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how best to "remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions, 1 97 and effort to
articulate a standard to police the limits of that latitude are entirely consistent with the antebellum- and Reconstruction-era understanding of
McCulloch described above.""8
Many have noted the tension between Boerne and Jones and have assumed that the deference embraced by Jones is truer to McCulloch than
the more active review espoused by Boerne.199 Indeed, because the Court
has struck down a significant amount of Fourteenth Amendment legislation under the Boerne standard, some have encouraged Congress to use
Section 2 as an alternative source of power to protect a broad array of
civil rights. 20 0 While this strategy is rational given Jones, it is not at all clear
that the Court would reaffirm Jones's holding regarding standards for judicial review if the issue were presented today. 20 1 Nor is it clear that the
Court should, as the best understanding of the ratification and immediate post-ratification history of the Thirteenth Amendment creates space
for more searching and meaningful review of Section 2 legislation than
Jones contemplates.

III. RESTORING THE MCCULLOCHVISION OF SECTION 2
A. Identifying the Ends of the Thirteenth Amendment
Section 2 gives Congress the "power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."2 0 2 Thus, Congress is empowered "[t]o put in execution" and "to cause to take effect" 2 3 the right conveyed by Section 1 of
the amendment, namely, the right to be free from "slavery" and "involuntary servitude." 20 4 As McCulloch, Prigg, and the history of Section 2 in

197. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519-20.
198. See supra notes Parts I.A, ILA, and I1B (describing earlier understanding of

McCulloch).
199. See, e.g., Amar, Intratextualism, supra note 115, at 822-23 (noting inconsistency
between Boerne and Jones and rejecting argument that Jones should be disregarded in
Boerne's favor); Lawrence G. Sager, Commentary, A Letter to the Supreme Court
Regarding the Missing Argument in Brzonkala v. Morrison, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 150, 152
(2000) (arguing Jones may be understood after Boerne as exercise of Congress's remedial
authority and that Congress has authority to address "enduring 'relics' of slavery"). But see
McAward, Scope, supra note 15, at 79-81 (noting tension and stating "Jones is arguably a
remnant of the past").
200. See, e.g., Sager, supra note 199, at 152-53 (arguing Violence Against Women
Act is valid because discrimination against women is "enduring, pervasive, and tentacular,"
similar to "badges, incidents, and relics of slavery" (internal quotations omitted)).
201. Compare Shelby County v. Holder, 811 F. Supp. 2d 424, 449 (D.D.C. 2011)
(holding Boerne provides proper standard for review of Fifteenth Amendment legislation),
with United States v. Beebe, 807 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1048-51 (D.N.M. 2011) (holdingJones is
applicable to Thirteenth Amendment legislation even after Boerne).
202. U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § 2.
203. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 559 (2004) (Scalia,J., dissenting).
204. U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § 1.
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Congress and the courts all make clear, the judiciary retains the final
power to interpret these terms and to establish what ends Congress may
pursue.2 0 5 While Priggimplicitly acknowledged that Congress can precede
the Court in interpreting particular constitutional provisions, the Court
demonstrated that it would not hesitate to review that interpretation de
20 6
novo.
Section 1 uses terms that had well-established and virtually synonymous meanings-focused on labor bondage-when the Amendment was
ratified.2 17 Most of the Court's Section 1 jurisprudence has focused on
the meaning of involuntary servitude and consistently has emphasized
that Section 1 conveys a right to be free of coerced labor. The most recent Section 1 case was United States v. Kozminski, where the Court stated
that involuntary servitude within the meaning of Section 1 requires a
showing of labor "enforced by the use or threatened use of physical or
20 8
legal coercion."
With respect to the abolition of slavery, the Court has characterized
Section 1 as a "grand yet simple declaration of the ... freedom of four
millions of slaves." 2 9 In the Civil Rights Cases, the Court stated that
Section 1 "establish[ed] . . . universal civil and political freedom
throughout the United States."" 0 While it is sensible to equate the abolition of slavery with the conferral of freedom, the Court has never explored how the concept of universal civil and political freedom might
translate to an affirmative self-executing right under Section 1. Indeed,
the Civil Rights Cases Court obviously did not regard freedom from private race discrimination as an essential aspect of the freedom conferred

by Section 1.211
The Court also has not explored in any depth whether Section 1 "itself did any more than" abolish slavery. 21 2 Although there have been periodic suggestions in dicta and dissent that Section 1 itself "prevents the
imposition of any burdens or disabilities that constitute badges of slavery
205. See supra Parts I, II.A (discussing McCulloch, Prigg, and legislative history of
Section 2). But see Balkin, supra note 6, at 1823 (arguing Reconstruction Amendments
"presumed that Congress and the courts were coequal partners in interpreting and enforc-

ing these provisions").
206. See Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 622 (1842) (holding 1793
Fugitive Slave Act was "clearly constitutional").

207. See Joseph E. Worcester, A Dictionary of the English Language 1314, 1352
(1860) (defining "slavery" as "servitude; bondage" and "servitude" as "slavery; bondage").

208. 487 U.S. 931, 944 (1988); see also Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 542 (1896)
("Slavery implies ... the control of the labor and services of one man for the benefit of
another, and the absence of a legal right to the disposal of his own person, property and
services.").
209. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (1 Wall.) 36, 69 (1872).
210. 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).
211. See id. at 20-25 (holding refusal by private inn owner to serve black patrons
"has nothing to do with slavery or involuntary servitude").
212. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968).
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or servitude," 213 the Court has never held this to be the case. Indeed,
Jones reserved this question while, at the same time, quoting the Civil
Rights Cases for the proposition that Section 2 allows Congress to
"abolisl[h] all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States. ' 2 14 As
discussed above, this formulation simultaneously recognizes the distinction between slavery and its badges and incidents and treats both as
proper ends that Congress can pursue under Section 2.215
Even though the Civil Rights Cases formulation has become part of
the Thirteenth Amendment "canon[]," 21 6 it is not self-evidently correct
that Congress can pursue the badges and incidents of slavery as ends in
themselves. Certainly, the Court has never held outright that Section 1
extends that far, and the language of Section 1217 as well as the history
surrounding the Civil Rights Act of 1866218 all point to a more limited
understanding of the ends sanctioned by the Amendment. In the debates
over the 1866 Act, it was widely agreed that the sole end that could be
pursued by Congress under Section 2 was ensuring the continued abolition of slavery and protecting a meaningful state of civil freedom for the
219
former slaves.
The impact of the Civil Rights Cases formulation hinges on how one
defines the concept of the "badges and incidents of slavery." If it refers
only to the legal apparatus of slavery-the constellation of rights that inhered in slaveowners and restrictions that bound slaves-then Section 1
did necessarily dismantle that system and void those laws. Under this definition, Section 2 legislation would have a limited focus on public laws
that attempted to reestablish that system. If, however, the concept of the
"badges and incidents of slavery" refers to a broader set of public and
private discriminatory practices, disaggregated from the corpus of slave
law, treating the elimination of the badges and incidents of slavery as an
end in itself for Thirteenth Amendment purposes would radically in-

213. Pessy, 163 U.S. at 555 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Bailey v. Alabama, 219
U.S. 219, 241 (1911) ("The words involuntary servitude have 'a larger meaning than slavery.' ... The plain intention was to abolish slavery of whatever name and form and all of
its badges and incidents." (quoting The Slaughter-HouseCases, 83 U.S. (1 Wall.) at 69)).
214. Jones, 392 U.S. at 439 (quoting The CivilRights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20).
215. See supra notes 175-189 and accompanying text (discussing Court's analysis of
scope of Section 2 power in Civil Rights Cases andJones).
216. See George A. Rutherglen, The Badges and Incidents of Slavery and the Power
of Congress to Enforce the Thirteenth Amendment, in The Promises of Liberty: The
History and Contemporary Relevance of the Thirteenth Amendment 163, 172 (Alexander
Tsesis ed., 2010).
217. U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § 1 ("Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except
as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist
within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.").
218. See supra Part II.B (discussing legislative history of Civil Rights Act of 1866).
219. See supra notes 134, 144-146 and accompanying text (noting agreement between Act's supporters and critics regarding proper end of Section 2 legislation).
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crease the number of legislative means that might be appropriate in
achieving that end.
Given the Supreme Court's reluctance to decide whether Section 1
"itself did any more than" abolish slavery, 220 it is at least possible (and
arguably better) to regard the Civil Rights Cases as an inartful statement of
the true parameters of the Section 2 power. Section 2 does permit
Congress to regulate the badges and incidents of slavery. However, it
does so not because such badges and incidents are themselves necessarily
unconstitutional, but because such regulation is a means to secure the
demise of slavery. 22' In other words, Section 2 clothes Congress with
power to pass all laws necessary and proper, including laws targeting the
badges and incidents of slavery, to ensure the permanent abolition of
slavery.
This theory is consistent with the primary justification offered by the
sponsors of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, who did not argue that the Black
Codes violated Section 1 of the Amendment. 222 While repressive, the
Codes did not effect a wholesale return of slavery. At the same time, it
was widely agreed that they were an effort to shape a labor system as close
to slavery as possible without crossing the line. By voiding these laws and
conveying a right to be free from racial discrimination in the exercise of
basic civil rights, the Civil Rights Act ensured that the law's beneficiaries
could not "be reduced to slavery. "223
This theory also would harmonize the Supreme Court's approach to
Congress's Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers. In Boerne, the Court claimed for itself the power to "determine what
constitutes a constitutional violation," 224 but acknowledged that Congress
is empowered to regulate some constitutional conduct in a prophylactic
'225
effort to "remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions and measures.
In the Thirteenth Amendment context, the same analytical structure applies. The Court has the final word over what constitutes slavery and involuntary servitude. And Congress is empowered to regulate the badges
and incidents of slavery because such legislation is prophylactic. It regulates conduct that does not otherwise violate Section 1 of the
Amendment in order to prevent unconstitutional conduct-namely,
slavery and involuntary servitude.

220. Jones, 392 U.S. at 439.
221. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883) ("[The Thirteenth
Amendment] clothes Congress with power to pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing badges and incidents of slavery in the United States.").
222. See supra notes 143-150 and accompanying text (describing arguments of supporters of 1866 Civil Rights Act).
223. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1118 (1866) (statement of Rep. James F.
Wilson).
224. 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997).
225. Id. at 518-20.
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Thus, hewing to current Supreme Court doctrine regarding the
right conveyed by Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment has several
virtues and limited vices. Focusing on coerced labor takes seriously the
text of Section 1 and comports with the understanding advanced by the
Amendment's sponsors during the debates over the 1866 Act. It also
aligns the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers
post-Boerne. And while it reinterprets the language of the Civil Rights
Cases, it does so in a manner that preserves Congress's ability to regulate
the badges and incidents of slavery.
Of course, questions remain. How is Congress to identify the badges
and incidents of slavery? And what latitude does Congress have in regulating them? The next sections address these issues.
B. Defining the Badges and Incidents of Slavery
The concept of the badges and incidents of slavery is susceptible to a
range of definitions. Some have asserted that the concept refers only to
public laws, 226 while others claim it encompasses private discrimination
based on race 227 or other immutable characteristics. 228 1 have argued elsewhere that the concept in fact has a more limited meaning, discernible
from the historical usage of the terms "badge" and "incident" of slavery
prior to the Civil Rights Cases.229 Drawing from that history, I have proposed that the concept refers to (and therefore that the Section 2 power
is limited to) "public or widespread private action, based on race or previous condition of servitude, that mimics the law of slavery and has significant potential to lead to the de facto re-enslavement or legal subjugation
23 0
of the targeted group."
Even if mine is the most supportable definition, there are many approaches that likely would withstand the deferential rationality review
mandated by Jones. Congress might determine, for example, that because
arbitrary prejudice was at the core of southern chattel slavery, "any act
226. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 25 (invalidating Civil Rights Act of 1875,
which regulated private conduct).
227. See William J. Carter, Jr., Race, Rights, and the Thirteenth Amendment:
Defining the Badges and Incidents of Slavery, 40 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1311, 1350 (2007)
(describing Jones Court's analysis that private housing discrimination was unconstitutional
as badge and incident of slavery).
228. See G. Sidney Buchanan, The Thirteenth Amendment and the Badge of Slavery
Concept: A Projection of Congressional Power, in The Quest for Freedom: A Legal History
of the Thirteenth Amendment 175, 177 (1976) ("The badge of slavery concept should be
held to include only that prejudice which is arbitrary ... [based on] factors that have no
rational bearing upon such person's ability to discharge the function sought.").
229. McAward, Defining, supra note 16, at 570.
230. Id. at 630. One can understand the last part of this definition, which requires a
causal link between the regulated conduct and a violation of Section 1, as simply another
way of articulating the need for judicial monitoring of the basic means-ends "fit" of
Section 2 legislation. See infra Part III.C (discussing judicial review of congressional determination of means in Section 2 legislation).
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motivated by arbitrary class prejudice" 23 1 is therefore a badge and incident of slavery. Under this definition, Congress could then use Section 2
to regulate virtually any discriminatory act committed against any subset
of the population. Such a construction would render the Fourteenth
Amendment enforcement power superfluous 23 2 and would raise federalism concerns by permitting Congress to regulate conduct generally
thought to be subject to state police power. Therein lies the risk of Jones.
Giving Congress the power to adopt its own meaning of the badges and
incidents of slavery essentially permits Congress to set the scope of its
Section 2 power. 233 Such a possibility emphasizes the importance of
preserving a meaningful role for the judiciary in defining the badges and
incidents of slavery and, with it, determining the outer bounds of the
Section 2 power.
But if, as the previous section argues, Congress can regulate the
badges and incidents of slavery not as ends in themselves, but as a means
to the end of preventing or remedying coerced labor, was Jones necessarily wrong to give Congress the power to define the badges and incidents of slavery? 234 Just as McCulloch posited that the ends pursued by
Congress must be "legitimate," it held that Congress deserves substantial
discretion in its assessment of how to achieve constitutional ends. 2 5 If the
"badges and incidents of slavery" is a category of means, then Congress
arguably should have considerable leeway in dealing with that category of
conduct.
The problem with the "badges and incidents of slavery" formulation
is that it is still a concept that requires independent definition, whether it
is treated as a means or an end. There must be a substantive framework
for understanding what a badge and incident of slavery is before
Congress can designate a particular type of conduct as falling into that
category, much less decide how to regulate it. Even if Congress's regulatory choices warrant deference, there is value and wisdom in giving the
Court power to supervise the definitional aspect of this endeavor, even if
such definitions are not constitutional questions per se. Indeed, the
Court is institutionally equipped to articulate a definitional framework
231. Buchanan, supra note 228, at 177.
232. Cf. Balkin, supra note 6, at 1820 ('just as the denial of equal civil rights was a
badge and incident of slavery [redressable under Section 2 of the Thirteenth
Amendment], the enjoyment of equal civil rights was a badge and incident of citizenship [enforceable under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment].").
233. Others are more sanguine on this point. See, e.g., Amar, Intratextualism, supra
note 115, at 824 (noting concept of "badges and incidents of slavery" identifies desirable
"middle ground" where "Congress has less than plenary and more than remedial power").
However, Jones does not cabin Congress's substantive or remedial discretion in any meaningful way.
234. See supra Part II (discussing influence of McCulloch and Prigg on early
understanding of Congress's Section 2 Power).
235. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819) ("We admit, as
all must admit, that the powers of government are limited .. ").
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for the badges and incidents of slavery, guided by objective historical
sources rather than its own policy preferences. 216 Without the Court's
involvement and commitment to a distinct analytical methodology,
Congress would have unbounded discretion to set the scope of its Section 2 power.
C. Regulating the Badges and Incidents of Slavery
Even if one agrees that the Court has the ultimate authority to define and enforce the concept of the "badges and incidents of slavery,"
Congress's institutional expertise allows it to determine whether regulating a particular badge or incident of slavery will make the violation of
Section 1 less likely. McCulloch indicates that these types of judgments
deserve substantial but not wholesale deference. That opinion disclaimed
judicial power to assess the "degree of necessity" between the chosen
means and the constitutional end,237 but as Part I notes, it did not disclaim the Court's power to consider the baseline questions of whether
legislation is "plainly adapted to" and "tend[s] directly to" a legitimate
end. 23 8 Indeed, Priggshows that the Supreme Court did not believe itself
disempowered to review Congress's chosen means of enforcing the
Fugitive Slave Clause.2 39 Thus, McCulloch-particularly as understood and
applied in the years leading up to the ratification of the Thirteenth
Amendment-established that the Court owed Congress substantial deference with respect to its factual and causal assessments, yet it did not
entirely foreclose judicial review of the causal and regulatory decisions
underlying executory legislation.
In other constitutional contexts, the Supreme Court recently has
taken a more vigorous role in evaluating Congress's causal assessments
and regulatory choices-perhaps in an attempt to re-embrace the true
legacy of McCulloch as embodied in Section 2. In United States v. Comstock,
the Court upheld a federal civil commitment statute under the Necessary
and Proper Clause. 240 While a five-member majority cited McCulloch and
discussed the deference due Congress's means-ends assessments, it ultimately relied on its own assessment of "five considerations" in determining that the statute was an appropriate means of executing Congress's

236. See McAward, Defining, supra note 16, at 570-82 (discussing legal and popular
uses of terms "badge" and "incident" predating Thirteenth Amendment and Civil Rights
Cases).
237. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 423.
238. Id. at 419, 421; see also Marshall, Constitution, supra note 63, at 186-87 (justifying and explaining Court's opinion in McCulloch); Marshall, Union, supra note 30, at 100
(same).
239. See Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 568 (1842) (discussing
Congress's chosen method of enforcing Fugitive Slave Clause); see also supra notes 77-87
(discussing PriggCourt's review and selective approval of Fugitive Slave Act of 1793).
240. 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1956 (2010).
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enumerated powers.2 4 ' Separate opinions by the other Justices were even
more candid about the need for the Court to assure itself that Congress
was pursuing a constitutional end 24 2 and had not adopted means too
243
attenuated from that end.
Recent Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendment decisions
also provide examples of this shift in the Court's approach. For
Commerce Clause purposes, the analogous question is whether the conduct that Congress has chosen to regulate has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. After decades of deferring to Congress on this issue,
the Court took a much more active role in United States v. Lopei24 4 and
United States v. Morrison,245 in which the Court struck down, respectively,
the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 and a federal civil remedy for the
victims of gender-motivated violence. 2 46 While the precise analyses of
those cases are not relevant here, two aspects of the Court's methodology
in assessing "substantial effects" deserve comment. First, in Lopez, the
Court encouraged (but did not require) Congress to develop a factual
record and issue findings that "would enable [the Court] to evaluate the
legislative judgment" regarding the effect of the regulated activity on interstate commerce. 24 7 Second, in both Lopez and Morrison, the Court
demonstrated its willingness to scrutinize Congress's causal assessments
carefully and to vindicate its own judgment that the conduct in question
was too attenuated from interstate commerce to satisfy the demands of
248
the Commerce Clause.
Similarly, the Court embraced a far less deferential standard for its
review of Fourteenth Amendment enforcement legislation in Boerne. The
241. Id. at 1965.
242. See id. at 1975 & n.7 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (criticizing Court for skipping
McCulloch's first step of determining whether end is legitimate).
243. See id. at 1966-67 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing Court
should use more than rational basis scrutiny in evaluating means-ends fit); id. at 1970
(Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) ("The Necessary and Proper Clause does not give
Congress carte blanche.").
244. 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995).
245. 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000).
246. It is not entirely clear that Lopez and Morrison mark a distinct new era in
Commerce Clause jurisprudence. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 23 (2005) (referring
to "larger context of modern-era Commerce Clause jurisprudence" beyond Lopez and
Morrison).
247. 514 U.S. at 563. But cf. Raich, 545 U.S. at 21 ("[W]hile we will consider congressional findings in our analysis when they are available, the absence of particularized findings does not call into question Congress' authority to legislate.").
248. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563-67 ("[Plossession of a gun in a local school zone is in
no sense an economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect
any sort of interstate commerce."); see also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609-13 (summarizing
Lopez); cf. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2646 (2012) (Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting) ("[T]he Commerce Clause, even when supplemented by the Necessary and Proper Clause, is not carte blanche for doing whatever
will help achieve the ends Congress seeks by the regulation of commerce.").
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Court clarified that Congress can enforce Fourteenth Amendment rights
by regulating otherwise constitutional conduct, but held that there must
be "a congruence and proportionality between the [constitutional] injury
to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end. ' 24 9 This
standard is meant to help the Court evaluate whether Congress's regulation of constitutional conduct will substantially prevent or remedy unconstitutional conduct. 2 ° As in the Commerce Clause context, the Court
has encouraged Congress to build a detailed record-here, demonstrat25 1
ing "evidence of a pattern of constitutional violations" by the States.
Moreover, the Court has embraced a less deferential stance in determining whether the statute in question "is an appropriate response to this
252
history and pattern."
Each decision mentioned above seems to be grounded in the implicit acknowledgment that the Court must play a more meaningful role
in scrutinizing Congress's causal assessments and regulatory choices than
the post-New Deal reading of McCulloch would have it.253 Even if some of
those decisions are susceptible to criticism that the Court has supplanted
McCulloch's framework of deference with too stringent a level of scrutiny, 254 their essential insight can guide reform efforts in the Thirteenth
Amendment context.

249. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
250. Id. at 519 (noting congruence and proportionality standard draws line between
"measures that remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions and measures that make a substantive change in the governing law").
251. Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 729 (2003).
252. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 530 (2004). The Court has held that a number
of civil rights statutes fail to satisfy the congruence and proportionality standard. See, e.g.,
Coleman v. Court of Appeals, 132 S. Ct. 1327 (2012) (holding Congress did not validly
abrogate states' sovereign immunity in self-care provision of Family and Medical Leave
Act); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding Title I of
Americans With Disabilities Act exceeds Congress's power under Section 5 of Fourteenth
Amendment); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Violence Against Women
Act); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (Age Discrimination in Employment
Act).
253. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 52 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (expressing concern that unless Congress proffers more than "mere assertion" in favor of its regulation, "the Necessary and Proper Clause will always be a back door for unconstitutional
federal regulation"); cf. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923 (1997) (describing
Necessary and Proper Clause as "the last, best hope of those who defend ultra vires congressional action").
254. See Caminker, supra note 46, at 1147 (arguing Boerne "clearly deviated from the
Court's longstanding articulation and application of the more deferential McCulloch
means-ends standard"); Powell, supra note 34, at 750-51 (arguing Comstock evinces "a belief in the constitutional propriety of subjecting congressional choices to close judicial
examination that is fundamentally alien to" McCulloch). In United States v. Morrison, for
example, the Court struck down a provision of the Violence Against Women Act even
though there was an extensive congressional record documenting the link between gender-motivated violence and interstate commerce. 529 U.S. at 615 (rejecting Congress's
findings linking violent crime to interstate commerce as "attenuated" and "unworkable");
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How might this insight translate to the Thirteenth Amendment context? First, it points to the value of a well-constructed congressional record. Although the Court cannot mandate that Congress follow particular
procedures, it would be helpful if Congress, in passing Section 2 legislation, developed a record that demonstrated a link between the regulated
conduct and the threat of Section 1 violations.
Second, the Court must play some role in reviewing Congress's findings. While McCulloch clearly contemplates judicial deference, it also provides administrable standards for judicial review-the Court can ask
whether Congress's regulation will "tend[] directly to" 25 5 prevent or remedy violations of Section 1. Conversely, the Court can examine whether
25 6
Congress's regulation has only "distant conduciveness to the object."
Perhaps the best rule would be for the Court to defer to a congressional
record that adequately supports the causal link, even if there is other,
conflicting evidence on point. Indeed, several commentators "have suggested that the thoroughness of legislative procedures-e.g., whether
Congress took a 'hard look'-might sometimes make a determinative
difference" with respect to whether the Court is willing to defer to congressional findings. 257 One might call this a modified congruence and
proportionality standard that vindicates McCulloch as understood by the
framers of the Thirteenth Amendment: a standard that balances a meaningfuljudicial role with the deference due to Congress.
The clearest rejoinder to these proposals is that the sponsors of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 explicitly stated their understanding that the
Court would have no role in reviewing the efficacy of Thirteenth
Amendment legislation. Trumbull and Wilson repeatedly invoked
McCulloch and Prigg and claimed that such a judgment was exclusively in
Congress's province. 25 As discussed above, however, their claims on this
point are not in line with the then-prevailing understanding or the expected application of those cases. 259 Given the language of McCulloch,
Marshall's public explanations of the case's holding, and the Court's own
post-McCulloch precedent, including Prigg, an informed observer in the
1860s would have perceived a meaningful role for the Court even with
respect to assessing the means-ends fit of federal legislation. Trumbull's
and Wilson's claims are not solely determinative of the original public
meaning of Section 2, and, particularly on this point, unfairly and un-

contra id. at 634 (SouterJ., dissenting) (defending rationality of Congress's judgment "in
view of the data amassed").
255. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 419 (1819).
256. Marshall, Union, supra note 30, at 100.
257. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 663 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (collecting sources).
259. See supra notes 151-154 and accompanying text (describing defense of congressional power by Trumbull and Wilson).
259. See supra Part II.B (evaluating Senator Trumbull and Representative Wilson's
invocations of McCulloch and Prigg).
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necessarily minimize the role of the judiciary in policing the outer
bounds of the Section 2 power.
How might these proposals work with respect to real legislation? The
Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act is the
most recent law passed under Congress's Section 2 power. In relevant
part, the law imposes criminal penalties on anyone who willfully injures
another because of that person's "actual or perceived race, color ... or
national origin." 6 ' In its findings, Congress noted that race-based hate
crimes were widespread and had serious consequences for the victim and
her community. 261 Then, Congress stated:
Slavery and involuntary servitude were enforced, both prior to
and after the adoption of the 13th amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, through widespread public
and private violence directed at persons because of their race,
color, or ancestry, or perceived race, color, or ancestry. Accordingly, eliminating racially motivated violence is an important
means of eliminating, to the extent possible, the badges,
inci2 62
dents, and relics of slavery and involuntary servitude.
This analysis is surely rational on all counts and thus comports with
Jones.263 But the analysis lacks two critical elements. First, although it
implicitly suggests that the badges and incidents of slavery require a historical tie to slavery, it does not explicitly invoke a definition of that concept, much less attempt to satisfy its elements. Second, the analysis lacks
any indication that the victims of race-based hate crimes are at risk of
having their Section 1 rights violated, either by being treated as slaves or
denied basic civil freedom; nor does the analysis feature any finding that
federalizing such crimes will alleviate that risk. If Congress did amass a
record that would support such findings, the Court would almost certainly defer to it. But Congress has not done so.
To date, Congress has used Section 2 to pass a relatively limited
range of laws, most of which have focused directly on slavery and involuntary servitude.2 64 The few that have sought to regulate the badges and
incidents of slavery (such as the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the recent
260. Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 249 (Supp. IV 2011).
261. Id. § 249 note.
262 Id.
263. See Constitutionality of the Matthew Shepard Hate Crimes Act, 33 Op. O.L.C.
(June 16, 2009) (release at 2-5), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/2009/shepardhate-crimes.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) ("[W]e believe Congress has authority under section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment to punish racially motivated violence as part of a reasonable legislative effort to extinguish the relics, badges and incidents
of slavery.").
264. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1581 (2006) (criminalizing peonage); id. § 1584
(criminalizing involuntary servitude); id. §§ 1585-1588 (criminalizing slave trade); id.
§ 1589 (criminalizing forced labor); id. § 1590 (criminalizing human trafficking); id.
§ 1591 (criminalizing sex trafficking).
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Hate Crimes Act) have focused on widespread race-based discrimination.
Thus, Congress has not yet invoked the full range of its Section 2 power
as interpreted in Jones.
There is, however, no guarantee that this restraint will last. As the
Court more strictly scrutinizes legislation passed under Congress's
Commerce and Fourteenth Amendment powers, it is entirely plausible
that Congress could rely more heavily on its Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power to address a wide variety of racial and nonracial civil
rights issues. Indeed, many scholars have urged Congress in this direction. 265 Thus, it is important for practical as well as theoretical reasons to
reconsider Jones and to theorize more precisely regarding Congress's
power to define and regulate the badges and incidents of slavery.
CONCLUSION

Congress's power to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment is commonly assumed to track its power to pass executory legislation, as described in McCulloch v. Maryland. However, the sense of plenary congressional power that conventionally accompanies invocations of McCulloch is
not, in fact, an accurate view of that opinion, much less the Section 2
power. McCulloch preserved a role for the judiciary to review actively the
ends of federal legislation and deferentially (but meaningfully) the
means utilized by Congress to achieve those ends. This judicial role was
clearly part of the understanding and anticipated application of
McCulloch by the time the Thirteenth Amendment was ratified and the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 enacted.
In the Section 2 context, this reading of McCulloch permits a greater
judicial role in defining the ends sanctioned by the Thirteenth
Amendment as well as the concept of the badges and incidents of slavery.
And while it mandates deference to Congress's choices in regulating the
badges and incidents of slavery, it also permits some level ofjudicial oversight of the means-ends fit between legislation and the ends set forth in
Section 1 of the Amendment.
Given the Supreme Court's recent willingness to strike down legislation passed pursuant to Congress's Commerce Clause and Section 5
powers, there is an understandable desire to identify an alternative constitutional basis for Congress's civil rights agenda. However, Section 2 of
the Thirteenth Amendment alone cannot bear this weight. It would be
far better to make sure that the real McCulloch view of congressional
power is vindicated in every enforcement context. Such an approach
might require a revision of Jones and even a modification of the congruence and proportionality standard of Boerne, but it would be preferable to

265. See supra notes 6-14 and accompanying text (detailing scholars' use of
Thirteenth Amendment to address various social problems).

2012] McCULLOCH AND THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT

1809

the current view that would shoehorn all civil rights enforcement into
the Thirteenth Amendment.
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